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181 Despite the grim struggle for survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, and possessed of a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination and unceasing faith that, despite all, the fortunes of his family would steadily improve.

B. The Pattern of Urban Life

369 Urban life, although it meant a different pattern of work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town and city dwellers -- perhaps 20 per cent of China's population -- kept their ties with their native villages, returned there whenever possible and many saw commercial activity in the town only as a means to the acquisition of sufficient wealth to buy farming land and return to the village.[12] The town population, then, was mostly made up of artisans and peasants, plus a small number of landlords, retired officials, county functionaries, and established merchant families.

632 369 The county seats (hsien capitals) were the centers for tax collection and administration of

12. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, pp. 18-19. The 1953 Communist census credits cities and towns (undefined) with 13.26 per cent of the Mainland population.

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178 There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

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668 These two factors are closely inter- related. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has
> organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly
> mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friend-
> ship and love.[29]

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29 Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p.21. Three-character rhymed verses [cont'd next page]

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668 In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).[30] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[31]

[29. from previous page] were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

30. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953) pp. 31-44.

31. Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd. ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, this term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16
[redacted]

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

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A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

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32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still,

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of others [the group] : this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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In traditional China, time and change were

42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

44. Cf. Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," Far Eastern Notes, No. 1. April 21, 1952.

178 regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjust-
181 ment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of
668 Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen a the end of the line but as a return to childhood -- not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided." [45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change

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45. San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

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is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i:

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect. Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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46. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

47. Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

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178 668 181 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 668 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

597 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

48. Ibid., pp. 37-40.

596 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

572 The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

781 572 596 The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

181 176 When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family

51. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16

system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

596 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- some-
181 times denouncing their "reactionary" fathers --
668 and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

572 "Comradeship," the brother-friend type of
668 relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

576 The brotherhood-friendship pattern among
668 top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and
643 Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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53. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p.325.

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The great leader is like a father,
Mao Tse-tung educates us....[54]

Another praises his paternal care for his people

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

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As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as

54. From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

55. From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs], Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

56. From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF/6

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"a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says:

Our great fatherland-
We should pay it the same filial
reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

57. Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial] Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

58. In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yantze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

59. Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

60. The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has the baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

181 668 596 one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern

[61. and 62. on following page]

181 associated with the old image of brotherhood
668 and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly
596 subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

577 In traditional China, "face" meant one's
668 moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu). One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the rôle which society

61. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counterrevolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies.

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, op.cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp. 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

• 181 The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are wellnigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This circumstance, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally more conservative, less willing to

181 adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

565 184 The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. Especially in Southwest China, where warlords ruled until the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan, the development of a national feeling among the farmers has been late and slow. However, the cessation 565 722 of what used to be perpetual skirmishes between 184 warlords and the presence of a single centralized authority during World War II furnished many farmers in this region with a basis on which to form a concept of nationalism. Although no part of Southwest China was overrun by Japanese troops, the experiences of enemy bombings, anti-Japanese propaganda, and contact with refugees made

CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNITY

The Locality

West Town is within a day's journey on foot or horseback from Hsiakuan, the nearest point on the Burma Road. It has Er Hai (a lake) to one side and Ta'ang Shan, a mountain about 14,000 feet above sea level, to the other side. The general level of the ground in this part is about 6,700 feet above sea level. The chief occupation of the area is agriculture, rice being the staple crop. But trading in various forms is common both as a subsidiary and as the chief occupation. The trading includes both local exchanges in various markets and large-scale commercial adventures into the outer world. West Town is built on this peculiar form of commercialism.(3)

The locality is a small village or town, being under the jurisdiction of the district government of Tali. It has a population of about 1,000 households and about 8,000 people. Shops are not numerous, mostly groceries, cloth stores and a few food shops. There are a few native dispensaries and one apparently modern dispensary. The chief markets of exchange are the periodic fairs which take place both in and near the town.

The town is not walled. Some years ago four gates were erected which shut the town from the outlying villages at the ends of the two main thoroughfares of the town, which cross each other. At night the streets are patroled by a town-hired watchman. But the population of the town is not only confined to within these gates. Near the town are at least nine more or less clearly marked out-clusters of houses, each of which has a name as a village. Within the four gates, each street, or each section of a street, is also called a village.

People and Culture

The town with its nine near-by and several more distant villages is under the authority of a Chen-Chang (head of a sub-district) appointed by and under the direction of the governor of the district (Hsien Chang) of Tali. A small police force, supported by the town, maintains law and order. Generally speaking, the town and its satellite villages is one of the Min Chia colonies in Yunnan. But all inhabitants in the town and in all the nine near-by villages except one insists on their Chinese origin, and will be seriously offended if suggestions to the contrary are made to them. This controversial point is not the concern of this paper. It suffices here to observe that all except the inhabitants in that one village who profess to be Min Chias bind their women's feet and wear Chinese dress. But all speak Min Chia as their mother-tongue. Most men and a few women, however, speak Chinese (with a strong local accent) as well. Here the social differences between men and women is carried to its extreme. Virginity of unmarried women and chastity of married women are heavily guarded and valued. Women work while men enjoy light conversation over a cup of tea or beside a tray with an opium-smoking pipe.

(3) For a general description of the Tali area (the geographical conditions of Tali and its environs) the reader may look up C.P. Fitzgerald, The Tower of Five Glories, London, 1941. As a serious scientific effort the book is a hotchpotch of hearsay and observation which disgraces rather than deserves the name of ethnology. This will be dealt with elsewhere in extenso.

5: Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16
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S P 101 name of Chung-chia, and I have little doubt that considerable numbers of them might be found in the southern provinces of Kuang-hsi and Kuang-tung. The Yün-nan Chinamen in fact say that the Cantonese are Shans by race, and the facial resemblance between the Shan and the southern Chinaman is certainly remarkable.

S P 212 191 All the more civilised Shan States from Kamti at the sources of the western Irrawaddy down to Bangkok have an alphabetical system of writing and a very considerable literary language, which differs so much from the ordinary P 177 language used in conversation as to be incomprehensible to an uneducated man. In the more isolated communities, 212 where the Shans have been swamped by the Chinese, 191 though they preserve their own tongue in talking they often have no knowledge of any system of writing it.

Spread over such a large extent of country, there are naturally diversities of dialect in the language, but Shans S from very different countries can understand each other. P I remember a Siamese official from Bangkok who had P 771 little difficulty in understanding the conversation of the Bhamo Shans. In religion they are Buddhists of the Burmese type of Buddhism, but the priests are much more lax in their observances than those of Burma.

S P [142] 181 They are a short, but very strongly made race, yellow in complexion, with features of a decidedly Mongolian type. A very nice, pleasant people to travel among or to have anything to do with, as long as one does not want to get any work out of them. They can work hard enough in case of necessity, and many of them are very energetic traders, but as long as they can live comfortably by working at their fields for half the year, most of them prefer to spend the rest of their time in smoking and chewing betel nut.

They are not at all warlike or unfriendly to strangers. Their curiosity is certainly great, and they will sit round in scores and hundreds to look at a European, but it is a respectful curiosity, unaccompanied by the bad manners which, among the races of Eastern Asia, seem to be a monopoly of the Chinese. I must have travelled some fifteen hundred miles through Shan countries, and I never remember any difference of opinion or unpleasantness of any kind.